PQVault is a product of QuantiCor Security Visit QuantiCor Security LinkedIn
Research & standards4 min read

Hybrid certificates explained: composite, related certificates and Merkle Tree Certificates

How do post-quantum signatures get into certificates without breaking what exists? Hybrid approaches and their status at the IETF, in browsers and at the BSI.

Redaktion QuantiCor SecurityQuantiCor Security GmbH · Darmstadt
Hybride Zertifikate erklärt: Composite, verknüpfte Zertifikate und Merkle Tree Certificates
Key takeaways
  • For certificates, hybrid means a classical and a post-quantum algorithm both vouch for the same identity.
  • There are three routes — composite signatures, two related certificates and new formats such as Merkle Tree Certificates.
  • Private PKI can be tested today; the public web is heading down its own path via Merkle Tree Certificates.

The article Making certificates and SSH quantum-safe covered the roadmap for IT. One question remained open that comes up in every architecture discussion: should certificates carry only post-quantum signatures in future, or both, classical and new? This article goes deeper into hybrid certificates: which designs exist, where standardisation stands and what it means for companies.

Why hybrid at all?

Post-quantum algorithms are young. NIST's signature standards have been final since August 2024, but experience with implementations is still limited (see Post-quantum signatures: status at NIST and ISO). Classical algorithms are well understood but will become vulnerable to future quantum computers. Hybrid combines both: an identity is only valid if both signatures verify. As long as one of the algorithms is secure, so is the combination.

In its Technical Guideline TR-02102, Germany's BSI generally recommends post-quantum algorithms in hybrid form. For signatures the BSI sets a later deadline than for key agreement (press release of 11 Feb 2026), because a signature cannot be forged retroactively. Encrypted data, by contrast, can be intercepted today and decrypted later.

Design 1: composite signatures

With a composite signature, a classical and a post-quantum key are combined into one key, and each signature consists of two parts. To applications this looks like a single new algorithm. Verifiers must check both parts; an attacker would have to break both algorithms.

The IETF LAMPS working group is working on this in the draft "Composite ML-DSA for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure". It defines fixed pairs of classical and post-quantum algorithms and is intended as a standard, but is not yet an RFC.

Advantages: one certificate, one chain, a clear security statement. Disadvantages: certificates and signatures get larger, and every piece of software in the chain must know the new algorithm. Older systems reject such certificates.

Instead of combining keys, the same identity gets two certificates, a classical one and a post-quantum one. So that a verifier can be sure both belong to the same entity, the IETF standardised a method in RFC 9763 (June 2025): when requesting the new certificate, the applicant proves possession of the existing one, and the new certificate refers to it.

Advantages: existing systems keep working unchanged with the classical certificate, new systems additionally check the post-quantum certificate. Disadvantages: two certificates to manage, renew and revoke; the protocol must provide for both checks.

There are also older proposals to put both keys as extra fields into one certificate. They play a smaller role in current standardisation.

Design 3: new formats for the public web

For websites, size is the main problem. Setting up a connection today checks several signatures: certificate, intermediate certificate, certificate transparency proofs. With post-quantum signatures each of them would become much larger. In February 2026 Google announced that Chrome will not for now accept classical X.509 certificates with post-quantum signatures into its own root store, and is instead working with partners on Merkle Tree Certificates (Google Security Blog).

The idea: a certificate authority combines many certificates into a hash tree and signs only its root. For a single site the browser then needs only a short proof instead of several large signatures. The IETF is standardising the format in the new PLANTS working group. Let's Encrypt has announced it will take this route, with a test environment at the end of 2026 and production in 2027.

Rule of thumb: For internal systems your own PKI decides; on the public web browsers and certificate authorities decide — and they are currently going their own way.

What this means for companies

  • Private PKI: you can test here today. Pure post-quantum certificates per RFC 9881 are standardised; composite signatures and related certificates can be trialled in pilot environments.
  • Public websites: hybrid key agreement in TLS is already standard (see Quantum-safe TLS). For certificates: follow what browsers and certificate authorities do and prepare automation.
  • Network inspection: firewalls and systems that inspect connections must understand new formats. Ask vendors early about their plans.
  • Long-lived signatures: for documents, firmware and contracts with long validity, hybrid is the cautious choice today.

What you can do now

  1. Sort your certificates into three groups: public web, internal services, devices and signatures.
  2. Automate issuance and renewal so that changing algorithms does not become a project.
  3. Set up a test PKI and check which systems handle composite or related certificates.
  4. Include hybrid signatures in tenders for hardware security modules and devices.
  5. Keep an eye on Merkle Tree Certificates if you run public services.

PQVault: hybrid from the start

PQVault uses NIST-standardised post-quantum algorithms consistently in hybrid form, for encryption and signatures, and is built to be crypto-agile. Algorithms can be renewed without rebuilding processes. With the PQVault SDK you bring the same building blocks into your own applications and devices. With Files and Drive you protect documents regardless of how far the migration of your certificates has got. More for operators under Digital infrastructure & data centres.

PQVault is a product of QuantiCor Security GmbH, Darmstadt — specialists in post-quantum cryptography. More about QuantiCor Security

Three solutions for this topic

PQVault

Ready for data that stays confidential tomorrow?

Ready to go as SaaS, hosted in the EU. NIST-standardised post-quantum methods in every module.