Making certificates and SSH quantum-safe: a roadmap for IT
In SSH, key exchange has long been quantum-safe; for certificates the migration is only beginning. What IT departments can do now.

- Current SSH versions have negotiated a hybrid, quantum-safe key exchange by default for years; legacy devices are the gap.
- Since October 2025 there has been an IETF standard for certificates with post-quantum signatures; on the public web the migration will take longer.
- The most important step is an inventory of all keys and certificates, with lifetimes and owners.
If you have logged into an older server with a current SSH client in recent months, you may have seen it: a warning that the connection does not use post-quantum key exchange. It is a good occasion to look at two pillars of IT that both rely on cryptography considered vulnerable to future quantum computers. Anyone who wants to make certificates and SSH quantum-safe is at two very different starting points.
SSH: key exchange is already well advanced
The most widely used free SSH implementation has used a hybrid key exchange by default since version 9.0 in 2022 — a classical and a post-quantum algorithm together. Since version 10.0 (April 2025) the default is a hybrid scheme with the NIST-standardised post-quantum component. Since version 10.1 (October 2025) the client warns when a connection is established without post-quantum key exchange (project notes).
For most companies this means: whoever keeps servers and clients up to date has already done the most important part. The gaps lie elsewhere:
- Network devices and appliances with built-in, often old SSH servers: switches, firewalls, storage systems, production controllers.
- Embedded clients in automation tools, file transfer programs and scripts with hard-coded algorithms.
- Servers with outdated operating systems that no longer receive current packages.
The keys for login and host verification are a different matter. They remain classical; post-quantum signatures for SSH are still being standardised. That is acceptable because a login cannot be forged retroactively. But the keys must be migrated before powerful quantum computers are available. Why signatures must be assessed differently from encryption is explained in our article on post-quantum signatures and standards.
Certificates: the standard is here, the ecosystem not yet
Certificates confirm that a server, a person or software is genuine. The signatures in them are almost without exception based on classical algorithms today. Since October 2025, RFC 9881 has been an IETF standard specifying how post-quantum signatures per FIPS 204 are used in X.509 certificates and revocation lists (RFC 9881).
This clears the way for private certificate authorities: internal services, device identities, VPN, code signing. Here you control issuer and verifier yourself and can test early.
On the public web it will take longer. Post-quantum signatures are much larger than today's; with certificate chains containing several signatures and transparency proofs, every connection setup would become noticeably heavier. Browser vendors and the IETF are therefore working on a more compact certificate format that is expected to become widely available only in the coming years. For website operators this means: hybrid key agreement in TLS is already standard (see Quantum-safe TLS); for public certificates, prepare rather than rush ahead.
Rule of thumb: For SSH the main task is cleaning up; for certificates it is preparing. In both cases everything starts with an inventory.
Quantum-safe certificates and SSH: the roadmap
- Create an inventory: all SSH servers and clients with version, all certificates with issuer, algorithm, lifetime and owner. Auditors increasingly ask for such an overview of the cryptography in use.
- Update SSH: bring servers and clients to current versions; list devices without post-quantum key exchange, talk to vendors or plan replacements.
- Short lifetimes and automation: whoever renews certificates automatically can later also switch the algorithm automatically. Manually maintained certificates with multi-year lifetimes are the biggest obstacle.
- Test private PKI: set up a test certificate authority with post-quantum signatures per RFC 9881 and check which systems process the certificates.
- Include hardware: hardware security modules, smart cards and tokens have long procurement cycles. Add support for the new algorithms to tenders now.
- Know the deadlines: the BSI only foresees classical asymmetric algorithms on their own until the end of 2031, and until the end of 2030 for applications with particularly high protection needs (BSI TR-02102). Our article on the EU roadmap summarises the European timeline.
Protecting data while the infrastructure migrates
Migrating SSH keys and certificates takes years. During this time, confidential documents continue to sit on servers, in mailboxes and in backups. They can be protected independently of the infrastructure by encrypting them end-to-end before storing or sending them.
PQVault during the transition
PQVault Files encrypts files directly on the computer, with NIST-standardised post-quantum algorithms in hybrid form, and lets you take access back later. For your own applications and internal services, the PQVault SDK offers the same building blocks, built to be crypto-agile. More scenarios for operators under Digital infrastructure & data centres.
PQVault is a product of QuantiCor Security GmbH, Darmstadt — specialists in post-quantum cryptography. More about QuantiCor Security


